SEPARATION OF POWERS IN INDIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Abstract

The doctrine of separation of powers, a cornerstone of democratic governance, envisions distinct roles for the legislature, executive, and judiciary to prevent concentration of authority and ensure checks and balances. This study examines the application of this principle in India, where the constitutional framework adopts a modified separation rather than a strict division, blending parliamentary accountability with judicial independence. While the Indian Constitution distributes powers among the three branches, overlaps exist—such as the executive's dominance over the legislature, judicial activism, and the judiciary's encroachment into policymaking. The paper analyzes key constitutional provisions, landmark judicial rulings (e.g., Kesavananda Bharati, NJAC Case), and contemporary trends like judicial overreach and executive ordinances to assess whether India’s system maintains equilibrium or suffers from institutional imbalances. Findings reveal that while the judiciary has often acted as a check on executive excesses, the legislature’s weakening role and executive dominance in lawmaking raise concerns about democratic erosion. The study concludes by debating whether India needs stricter separation or a more flexible, context-driven balance to uphold constitutional governance.