INTER-STATE DISPUTES AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

Abstract

Inter-state disputes in India, arising from territorial claims, resource allocation, and jurisdictional conflicts, pose significant challenges to federal harmony and governance. This study examines the role of judicial intervention in resolving such disputes within India's constitutional framework. The paper analyzes the constitutional provisions (Articles 131, 262, and 263) that govern inter-state disputes and the judiciary's evolving approach in adjudicating conflicts related to water-sharing (e.g., Cauvery and Krishna River disputes), boundary demarcations (e.g., Assam-Nagaland conflict), and financial matters. It evaluates the effectiveness of judicial mechanisms, including the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and specialized tribunals, in balancing state autonomy with national interest. The study also explores alternative dispute resolution methods, such as inter-state councils and mediation, while assessing their efficacy compared to judicial processes. Through case studies and legal analysis, the paper highlights the tension between legal adjudication and political negotiation in conflict resolution. Findings indicate that while judicial intervention provides a structured resolution mechanism, excessive litigation often prolongs conflicts, underscoring the need for stronger institutional frameworks for cooperative federalism. The study concludes with recommendations to enhance preventive diplomacy, improve inter-state coordination, and reform dispute resolution mechanisms to preserve India's federal structure while ensuring timely justice.