FEDERALISM AND COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA

Abstract

Federalism in India represents a unique model of quasi-federal governance, blending centralized authority with regional autonomy to accommodate the nation's socio-political diversity. This study examines the evolution, challenges, and dynamics of cooperative federalism in India, analyzing constitutional provisions (Articles 245–263), fiscal mechanisms (Finance Commission, GST Council), and institutional frameworks (Inter-State Council, NITI Aayog) that facilitate center-state collaboration. The paper evaluates tensions between unitary tendencies (e.g., President's Rule, centralized planning) and state demands for greater autonomy, particularly in areas like resource allocation, law enforcement, and policy implementation. Through case studies (e.g., GST implementation, river water disputes, pandemic management), it assesses how political, economic, and administrative conflicts are negotiated within India's federal structure. Findings reveal that while institutions like the GST Council exemplify successful cooperative federalism, asymmetrical power distribution, partisan politics, and fiscal imbalances often hinder equitable governance. The study concludes with recommendations to strengthen inter-governmental trust, enhance fiscal decentralization, and institutionalize dialogue mechanisms to balance national unity with regional aspirations in India's complex federal democracy.