TOWARDS A THEORY OF MACHINE REA: RETHINKING CULPABILITY IN AN INTELLIGENT WORLD

Abstract

As artificial intelligence systems increasingly make independent decisions with tangible human consequences, the legal concept of mens rea—the “guilty mind”—points an intellectual crisis. This argues that while machines lack consciousness or moral intent, their programmed programmer and learning capacities can instantiate forms of functional intent that demand a reform of culpability in law, ethics, and governance. In the past era, artificial intelligence has moved from the boundary of science fiction into everyday life. Now a times Algorithms diagnose disease, drive cars, trade billions in assets, and even recommend prison sentences to accused. As machines increasingly act in ways that appear society faces a extreme challenge: how should we understand culpability in a world where non-human entities make decisions that harm or helpful for human beings? This tension calls for a new conceptual framework: machine rea—the study of how responsibility, intent, and culpability can be meaningfully attributed to machine agents in an intelligent world. This paper proposes a framework for “machine rea”: the attribution of intentionality, foresight, and accountability in machine agents, assessing liability in culpability of crime.