STEERING FEDERALISM: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION IN INDIA’S EVOLVING FEDERAL STRUCTURE

Abstract

Post the basic structure doctrine, what was established as an immutable constitutional feature has, in recent years, undergone a dynamic and active change. Indian federalism has been at the centre of institutional conflicts between the Union, the States and the Governors. The increased invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 131 reflects constitutional tensions within India’s federal structure. These developments lead to the growing importance of judicial intervention in maintaining the constitutional balance of powers. This chapter examines the evolving role of the Supreme Court as an arbiter of Centre–State and Governor–Government conflicts and its contribution to the development of judicial federalism in India. This study adopts a doctrinal method to analyse the key constitutional provisions, and recent and landmark judicial decisions. It explores whether judicial adjudication has reinforced the autonomy of States or facilitated an expansion of central authority through constitutional interpretation. The chapter contributes to ongoing debates on the evolving model of Indian federalism and the role of the constitutional court in managing intergovernmental conflicts, but also that increasing involvement of courts also raises questions regarding judicial overreach. By drawing contemporary disputes with broader implications in mind, this chapter assesses the judiciary’s capacity to act as a neutral constitutional umpire in an era of heightened political contestation.