JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN INDIA

Abstract

Federalism within the Indian constitutional framework represents a dynamic and evolving system shaped significantly through judicial interpretation and constitutional adjudication. Rather than operating as a rigid institutional arrangement, Indian federalism functions through a continuous constitutional dialogue between the Union and the States, with the judiciary playing a central role in maintaining this balance. The Supreme Court safeguards federal equilibrium by interpreting legislative competence, resolving intergovernmental disputes, and protecting democratic accountability within the constitutional structure. The constitutional foundations of judicial federalism are primarily embodied in Articles 131 and 246, along with the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which collectively regulate the distribution of legislative powers and empower the Supreme Court to adjudicate federal disputes. Through constitutional interpretation, the judiciary transforms textual federalism into a living constitutional principle responsive to evolving political and institutional realities. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has further elevated federalism to a basic feature of the Constitution. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, the Court recognized federalism as part of the Basic Structure Doctrine, while in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India it curtailed the misuse of Article 356 and reinforced the democratic legitimacy of State governments. These decisions established judicial review as a vital mechanism for preserving federal balance and preventing excessive centralization. Contemporary challenges to Indian federalism include fiscal centralization, the constitutional role of Governors, the evolving framework of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), and increasing intergovernmental tensions within a technologically integrated governance structure. In addressing these concerns, the judiciary performs a delicate constitutional function by maintaining federal equilibrium without encroaching upon the political domain.