INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY (PRAMĀṆA-ŚĀSTRA): SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE, ERROR THEORIES, AND LIBERATION

Abstract

This chapter examines the rich and diverse tradition of Indian epistemology (Pramāṇa-śāstra), focusing on the nature, sources, and validity of knowledge in classical Indian philosophy. It explores the major pramāṇas—perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, postulation, and non-cognition—highlighting how different philosophical schools interpret and justify these means of knowledge. Special attention is given to the epistemological frameworks of Jainism, Buddhism, and Advaita Vedānta, each of which offers a distinctive perspective on the nature of reality and the process of knowing. Jain epistemology emphasizes the many-sidedness of truth (anekāntavāda), advocating intellectual humility and perspectival understanding. Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga and Dharmakirti refine the concepts of perception and inference, underscoring momentariness and the role of cognition in constructing reality. Advaita Vedānta, as articulated by Adi Shankaracharya, redefines knowledge as the realization of non-dual Brahman. The chapter also analyzes the problem of error through various khyāti-vādas, demonstrating how different schools explain illusion and false cognition in accordance with their metaphysical commitments. Ultimately, the discussion reveals that Indian epistemology is not merely theoretical but deeply transformative, linking valid knowledge with liberation (mokṣa). It underscores the enduring relevance of epistemological inquiry in understanding both the world and the self.